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Abstract 
We explicate a knowledge-activation framework depicting the link between lay personality 
knowledge and dispositional judgments, building on work by C. S. Dweck, C. Chiu, and Y. 
Hong (1995a, b).  According to this framework, most people possess knowledge consistent with 
an entity theory (personality is fixed) and incremental theory (personality is malleable), which 
operates according to knowledge-activation principles.  Consistent with this claim, we find that 
people render more confident dispositional judgments when their entity knowledge is made 
relatively more accessible through priming manipulations that activate aspects of their existing 
knowledge.  Findings also illustrate the usefulness of incorporating both specific and general 
knowledge in our analysis.  The present framework enhances and complements the individual-
differences approach to the study of person theories prevalent in the literature. 
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Lay Personality Knowledge and Dispositionist Thinking:  
A Knowledge-activation Framework 
Lay dispositionism, the tendency to use personality traits or other dispositions (e.g., 
intelligence) to explain and predict social actions or outcomes (L. Ross & Nisbett, 1991), has 
been linked to many inferential phenomena.  For example, people tend to infer an underlying 
trait based on a trait-consistent behavior, even if a situational explanation of the behavior is 
warranted (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979).  People also make overly confident 
predictions about another person’s behavior in a novel situation from knowledge of relevant 
traits, with insufficient regard to uncertainties about the person’s construal of the situation 
(Dunning, Griffin, Miljokovic, & Ross, 1990).  Furthermore, people overestimate the 
consistency of trait-relevant behavior across situations (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). 
A growing body of research on lay theories has emerged in social, cultural, and 
developmental psychology (for a review, see Morris, Ames, & Knowles, 2001), attesting to the 
importance of commonsense knowledge about the nature of the self and others in social thinking.  
Dweck and colleagues propose that people’s tendency to subscribe to lay dispositionism can be 
traced to their general theories about the malleability of personality (person theories) (Dweck, 
Hong, & Chiu, 1993; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997).  Specifically, 
an entity theory, the belief that personality consists of a set of fixed traits, orients the perceiver to 
use traits as a unit of analysis and to believe that behaviors across situations are mediated by 
underlying traits.  This belief fosters a strong tendency to subscribe to inferential practices 
associated with lay dispositionism.  By contrast, an incremental theory, the belief that personality 
consists of malleable qualities, orients the perceiver towards understanding situational-specific 
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psychological factors (e.g., emotional states, expectancies) that mediate behaviors, rather than 
towards assessing traits.  This belief leads to a weaker proclivity for lay dispositionism. 
Evidence based on Inter-individual Variations in 
 Person Theories Measured at a Particular Moment 
This proposal regarding the relation between person theories and lay dispositionism is 
supported by research that largely takes an individual-differences approach (Dweck et al., 
1995a).  Typically, researchers measure participants’ person theories at a particular moment, 
classifying those who hold an entity theory as entity theorists, and those who hold an incremental 
theory as incremental theorists.  Their tendency to subscribe to lay dispositionism is often 
assessed concurrently (within the same experimental session or questionnaire package) or 
proximally (within a one- to two-week interval) with the measurement of person theories.  
Relative to incremental theorists, entity theorists more readily attribute traits to a person based on 
trait-consistent behavior in a particular situation (Chiu et al., 1997; Heyman & Dweck, 1998).  
Entity theorists also predict behaviors from a person’s traits with greater confidence (Chiu et al., 
1997).  Moreover, entity theorists are more certain that trait-relevant behaviors will be consistent 
across situations (Chiu et al., 1997), and that a person’s traits will be temporally stable (Erdley & 
Dweck, 1993).   
The complexity of the relation between lay personality knowledge and dispositional 
judgments is not adequately depicted by the “time-limited” individual-differences approach 
predominant in the literature.  Particularly, this approach does not capture temporal instability in 
person theories and its implications for dispositional judgments.  The test-retest reliability of the 
three-item Person Theory Measure, a measure of general beliefs about the malleability of 
personality, drops from .82 over a two-week interval (Dweck et al., 1995a) to only .43 over an 
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eight-week interval (Poon & Koehler, 2004).  This level of temporal stability is arguably lower 
than that of many other individual-differences variables as measured by self-report (e.g., test-
retest reliabilities for scales tapping extraversion and anxiety are .80 and .73 respectively over 
eight weeks; for a review, see Schuerger, Zarrella, & Hotz, 1989).  Such instability limits the 
long-term predictive validity of person theories measured on a one-shot basis.  Poon and Koehler 
(2004) showed, for example, that while people’s confidence in inferring an individual’s standing 
on a trait (e.g., “tidy”) from their standing on a semantically related trait (e.g., “punctual”) was 
clearly associated with their person theories as measured on the day the inferences were made, its 
association with person theories as measured a month or two prior to the inference task was 
much weaker. 
A Knowledge-activation Framework: Conceptual Extensions 
 Although person theories are often measured as an individual-differences variable on a 
one-shot basis, Dweck and colleagues acknowledge the theoretical possibility that entity and 
incremental theories are knowledge constructs that might co-exist within an individual.  Indeed, 
along with other researchers (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Kruglanski, 1995), they have suggested (but 
not directly tested) that these theories can profitably be conceptualized within a knowledge-
activation framework (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b).  Extending this conjecture, we will 
contend specifically that a knowledge-activation framework can elucidate dynamic relations 
involving lay personality knowledge and dispositional judgments, including the instability in 
person theories noted earlier.  In this article, we develop such a knowledge-activation 
conceptualization, and empirically assess its usefulness. 
Dweck and colleagues have focused on unitary, abstract notions regarding the 
malleability of personality (e.g., agreement with the statement, “The kind of person someone is, 
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is something basic about them, and it can’t be changed very much”, Dweck et al., 1995a, p. 269).  
In the present analysis,  we consider also relatively concrete or specific pieces of knowledge 
supporting these abstract notions, such as factors shaping personality, ideas about specific traits, 
and memory of particular individuals (e.g., John becomes more courteous due to his parents’ 
training).  It is assumed that most people have acquired from their socio-cultural environment 
some knowledge consistent with an entity theory and some consistent with an incremental 
theory.  Within an individual, available pieces of entity-theory-consistent knowledge (including 
the abstract theory itself) form a loose knowledge cluster (entity knowledge), as do pieces of 
incremental-theory-consistent knowledge (incremental knowledge). 
Entity and incremental knowledge may operate in a manner similar to other constructs 
that have been widely investigated using a knowledge-activation approach, such as trait concepts 
(e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977), stereotypes (e.g., Sinclair & Kunda, 1999) and cultural 
theories (e.g., Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000).  Importantly, that individuals 
possess certain knowledge does not entail that they constantly apply it in their judgments.  
Existing personality knowledge needs to be activated (brought to mind) to influence judgments.  
Activation is assumed to spread within the entity and incremental cluster.  The accessibility of 
knowledge (the ease with which existing knowledge is retrieved) contributes to its activation (cf. 
Higgins, 1996).  While the extent to which relatively activated knowledge is ultimately applied 
in judgments may depend on other factors, such as epistemic motivations (cf. Ford & 
Kruglanski, 1995; Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000) and the judged relevance of the 
knowledge (cf. Higgins, 1996), here we focus on accessibility as it is a cornerstone of the 
knowledge-activation approach. 
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Like other knowledge constructs, the accessibility of lay personality knowledge may be 
affected by goals, prior activation, and interconnectedness with other existing knowledge (cf. 
Higgins, 1996).  Situational factors may produce temporary variations in the relative accessibility 
of entity versus incremental knowledge within an individual.  Chronic individual differences in 
knowledge accessibility may result from differential exposure to situations which engender 
relatively more frequent application of entity or incremental knowledge over a prolonged period 
(e.g., stable differences in family environments) (cf. Dweck et al., 1995b; Higgins, 1996).  At 
any given time, the relative accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge of an individual 
is a combined outcome of (1) its chronic accessibility and (2) temporary accessibility due to 
relatively transient situational influences (cf. Higgins, 1996).  Given that each of the core 
theories (unitary, abstract belief about the malleability of personality) is loosely linked to other 
pieces of knowledge consistent with it, one’s theorist status may serve as a general index (not 
necessarily the only index) of the relative accessibility of one’s entity versus incremental 
knowledge at the time of measurement.  Willingness to subscribe to an entity (incremental) 
theory can be taken as an indication that entity (incremental) knowledge is relatively more 
accessible at the time of measurement and therefore potentially more influential in inferential 
judgments.   
In sum, based on factors known to affect knowledge activation and use, one can specify 
conditions under which the relative influence of entity versus incremental knowledge varies 
between and within individuals.  Thus, a knowledge-activation framework holds promise in 
capturing complex, dynamic relations between lay personality knowledge and dispositional 
judgments. 
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Past findings can be readily interpreted within this framework.  In many studies where 
participants’ dispositional judgments are assessed concurrently or proximally with one-shot 
measurement of their person theories (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 
1999), theory effects may reflect inter-individual variations in the relative accessibility of entity 
versus incremental knowledge at or near the time of judgment.  Our finding that person theories 
exhibit some temporal instability may reflect within-person variation in knowledge accessibility 
due to idiosyncratic, naturally-unfolding changes in everyday contexts (e.g., John’s entity 
knowledge has become relatively more accessible since he re-connected with a friend whose 
personality has never changed) (Poon & Koehler, 2004).  This framework can also accommodate 
chronic individual differences in knowledge accessibility.  However, given that temporal 
instability may render one-shot measurement of person theories inadequate for depicting stable 
individual differences, our approach suggests that multiple measurements of the same 
individuals, averaged over an extended period, may be needed to yield better estimates of 
chronic accessibility. 
Current Research: Empirical Extensions 
 The current research empirically evaluates two aspects of the knowledge-activation 
framework.  The first concerns the additional insights that can be obtained by incorporating 
relatively specific personality knowledge in this framework.  One advantage, we suggest, 
pertains to the usefulness of trait-specific analysis.  In other lines of research, the value of such 
analysis is evident.  For example, Gidron, Koehler, and Tversky (1993) show that people 
perceive differences among trait terms in the minimum frequency of trait-consistent behaviors 
inherent in their meanings (e.g., friendly implies a higher minimum frequency of trait-consistent 
behaviors than creative).  Hence, for different traits, people require different number of trait-
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relevant behaviors for attribution, and expect different levels of cross-situational consistency in 
trait-relevant behaviors (see also Rothbart & Park, 1986).  As another example, M. Ross (1989) 
proposes that people perceive some traits to be more stable than the others, and that a theory of 
stability (change) induces a tendency to exaggerate consistency (change) between one’s past and 
present standing on various traits.  While Dweck et al. (1995a) show that a person may hold 
different malleability theories across broad domains (e.g., morality, intelligence, the world), trait-
specific differences have not been explored.  The current research extends Dweck and 
colleagues’ work by exploring the possibility that a person may perceive differences in 
malleability among traits (e.g., seeing polite as more malleable than aggressive).  Such 
differences may reflect culturally shared understanding or be specific to an individual (cf. M. 
Ross, 1989).  In Study 1, we investigate the role of such trait-specific knowledge in dispositional 
judgments.   
The second, more fundamental issue we explore concerns the premise that entity and 
incremental knowledge clusters are possessed by most people, subject to principles governing 
the operations of other knowledge constructs (e.g., stereotypes, cultural theories), as described 
earlier.  To date, there is no direct empirical evidence for this supposition.  The main focus of 
this research is to empirically assess the viability of a knowledge-activation approach to the 
study of person theories.  As a litmus test, the relative accessibility of participants’ entity versus 
incremental knowledge was manipulated through recent prior activation (Studies 2 & 3).  The 
present framework predicts that participants should make more (less) extreme dispositional 
judgments when their entity (incremental) knowledge is made relatively more accessible.   
Clear demonstration of knowledge accessibility effects requires procedures that utilize 
participants’ existing knowledge.  In Study 2, participants were asked to explain why the 
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personality of a fictitious character, presented in a biography, remained unchanged (entity-prime 
condition) or changed a lot throughout his life (incremental-prime condition).  As people tend to 
select and use pieces of existing knowledge that fit well with the hypothesis to be explained (cf. 
Koehler, 1991), entity (incremental) knowledge is assumed to be made relatively more 
accessible, temporarily, in the former (latter) condition.  Similarly, in Study 3, participants were 
asked to evaluate the meaning of proverbs consistent with the notion that personality is fixed 
(entity-prime condition) or with the notion that personality is malleable (incremental-prime 
condition), on the assumption that interpretation of these proverbs requires use of the existing 
folkloristic or experiential knowledge being targeted.  
 These priming manipulations differ in an important way from a previously-used theory 
manipulation in which participants were presented with a fabricated scientific article containing 
persuasive arguments and empirical evidence for either an entity or incremental theory (e.g., 
Chiu et al., 1997; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998).  Use of the scientific article served well for 
the researchers’ purpose of establishing causal effects of person theories on judgments.  Yet, it is 
unsuitable (and was not intended) for the present purpose of capitalizing on the existing clusters 
of entity and incremental knowledge and assessing the impact of their relative accessibility on 
judgments.  The effect of the scientific article might, as our framework would predict, result 
from momentary changes in the accessibility of existing knowledge, but it is also likely to impart 
participants with new and supposedly conclusive knowledge on whether personality is fixed or 
malleable, potentially producing enduring changes to their person theories.  In contrast, our 
priming procedures were designed to temporarily affect the relative accessibility of existing 
entity versus incremental knowledge, without providing participants with new, definitive 
knowledge that might create lasting changes in their beliefs about the malleability of personality. 
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Study 1 
 This study investigates the relation between dispositional judgments and naturally-
occurring beliefs about the malleability of personality at the time of judgments, with particular 
attention to the predictive utility of trait-specific beliefs.  Generally, we expect stronger entity 
beliefs to be associated with more confident dispositional inferences, whether we consider 
between-person variations in malleability beliefs, or within-person variations in perceived 
malleability among specific traits. 
Method 
Introductory psychology students (n = 97) first completed a questionnaire on 
dispositional inferences.  Each participant made four types of dispositional inferences: (1) 
predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits, (2) inferring traits from trait-relevant behaviors, 
(3) predicting cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behaviors, and (4) predicting 
temporal stability of traits.  Each item followed a format used in Kunda and Nisbett’s (1986) 
research on co-variation judgments, and involved an inference regarding a single trait.  Table 1 
illustrates four inference tasks involving the trait affectionate.  Participants made judgments on a 
probability scale running from 0% to 100%.  The midpoint of this scale (50%) indicates the 
belief that inferences cannot be made with any confidence based on the information provided.  
Increasing values beyond the midpoint reflect increasing confidence in dispositional inference.  
Each participant made inferences regarding 30 commonly-used personality traits, such as warm, 
polite, optimistic, and assertive, for each inference type. (All the traits are listed in Table 3, first 
column).  The order in which the four inference types appeared in the questionnaire was 
counterbalanced between participants in a Latin square design.   
-------Insert Table 1 about here------- 
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 Next, participants completed a 30-item scale on their beliefs about the malleability of a 
set of specific traits.  Each item concerns one of the 30 traits used in the inference task, and is 
worded similarly to the Person Theory Measure developed by Dweck et al. (1995a) (see below).  
For example, for the trait affectionate, participants indicated on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly 
agree; 6 = strongly disagree) the extent to which they agreed with this statement: “How 
affectionate a person is, is something fixed, and cannot be changed very much”.  Each 
participant’s ratings on the 30 items were averaged to yield an omnibus trait malleability score 
(Cronbach’s α = .93).  Lower scores reflect a stronger belief that this set of specific traits are 
fixed.  Taken individually, a response to a specific item (individual trait malleability score) 
reflects one’s belief about the malleability of a specific trait.   
 Participants also completed Dweck et al.’s (1995a) Person Theory Measure.  This 
measure comprises three items: (1) “The kind of person someone is, is something basic about 
them, and it can’t be changed very much”; (2) “People can do things differently, but the 
important parts of who they are can’t really be changed very much”; (3) “Everyone is a certain 
kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really change that” (p. 269).  
Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each item on a 6-point scale (1 = 
strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree).  Ratings on the three items were averaged to yield a 
person theory score (Cronbach’s α = .87), with a lower score reflecting a stronger general belief 
that personality is fixed (see Dweck et al., 1995a for details about the scale). 
Results 
Responses to Different Measures of Malleability Beliefs 
As one would expect some conceptual relation between person theory (i.e., general 
beliefs about the malleability of personality) and beliefs about the malleability of a set of specific 
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traits as a whole, not surprisingly, person theory scores and omnibus trait malleability scores 
were moderately positively correlated (r = .45, p < .01).  The degree to which person theory 
scores were associated with individual trait malleability scores varied among specific traits.  The 
average correlation between person theory scores and individual trait malleability scores was .26 
across all 30 traits.  Highest correlations were obtained for the traits loyal, reliable, affectionate, 
ambitious, and active (.48, .42, .39, .37, and .36 respectively), whereas lowest correlations were 
obtained for the traits tidy, secretive, shy, organized, and unconventional (.08, .10, .12, .14, and 
.17 respectively).  What underlies the variability in the degree to which the general person theory 
resembles the individual trait theories?  Conceivably, some traits bear stronger conceptual links 
with people’s general conception of personality than others (e.g., people’s general conception of 
a person may hinge more heavily on the trait affectionate than the trait tidy).  From a knowledge-
activation perspective, activation is more likely to spread between a specific trait construct and a 
general conception of personality under conditions of high connectedness (cf. Higgins, 1989).  
For specific traits that are more strongly connected to a general conception of personality, one 
might therefore expect closer resemblance between general person theory and individual trait 
theories. 
 Inter-individual variations in Malleability Beliefs at the Time of Judgment 
 Aggregating dispositional judgments across traits.  To examine the relation between 
inter-individual variations in malleability beliefs and various kinds of dispositional judgments, 
we first averaged each participant’s probability judgments over all 30 items within each 
inference type, thus yielding 4 judgment scores per participant.  These judgment scores served as 
the dependent variable in two separate regression analyses, with malleability beliefs, inference 
type, and their interaction as predictors.   Participants’ malleability beliefs were indexed by their 
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omnibus trait malleability scores in one analysis, and by their person theories scores in another 
(see Table 2).     
Before we present our results, some technical details are in order.  Note that malleability 
beliefs was a continuous between-subject variable here, and inference type was a categorical 
within-subject variable.  If we use mixed ANOVA to analyze such data, it is necessary to convert 
malleability beliefs into a categorical variable, and some information may be lost by such 
conversion.  To preserve malleability beliefs as a continuous variable, we chose to use multiple 
regression analyses instead of ANOVA.  In our multiple regression analyses, we used the 
technique of criterion scaling to identify and control for variance due to individual differences 
(as in a mixed ANOVA).  Briefly, a subject vector consisting of the unstandardized predicted 
score or mean on the criterion (i.e., the dependent or predicted variable) for each subject was 
created in the computation process.  Creation of this vector allows for separation of variance due 
to individual differences from unexplained error, and hence more precise and sensitive tests (see 
Pedhazur, 1982, Chapter 14, for details of how criterion scaling can be applied in multiple 
regressions to analyze mixed designs).  Results of our analyses are summarized in Table 2, in a 
format typically used for presenting mixed-ANOVA results. 
-------Insert Table 2 about here------- 
When the malleability beliefs were indexed by omnibus trait malleability scores, we 
found a significant relation between malleability beliefs and judgments (see Table 2, top panel).  
To elucidate this relation, Figure 1 (top panel) depicts the slope of a simple regression of 
participants’ composite judgment scores (computed by averaging each participant’s judgments 
across all traits and inference tasks) on their omnibus trait malleability scores.  As predicted, 
participants with lower omnibus trait malleability scores, namely those who expressed a stronger 
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belief that this set of specific traits are fixed, made more confident dispositional inferences than 
those with higher omnibus trait malleability scores.  A relation in a similar direction, though less 
pronounced (see Figure 1, bottom panel) and non-significant (see Table 2, top panel), was 
observed between person theory scores and dispositional judgments. 
-------Insert Figure 1 about here------- 
Malleability beliefs appear to have a similar effect on the four types of dispositional 
inferences.  Inference type did not interact reliably with malleability beliefs to influence 
judgments (see Table 2, bottom panel).
1
  Belief-related effects aside, we obtained a significant 
main effect of inference type (see Table 2, bottom panel).  Generally, stronger dispositional 
inferences were made from a person’s traits (M = 74.3% when predicting trait-relevant behaviors 
from traits; M = 68.9% when predicting temporal stability of traits) than from trait-relevant 
behaviors (M = 63.7% when predicting cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behaviors; 
M = 66.0% when inferring traits from trait-relevant behaviors).  As trait characterization of a 
person usually implies more than just one instance of trait-relevant behavior, it is perhaps not 
surprising that a person’s trait characterization affords stronger dispositional inferences than a 
trait-relevant behavior.   
Trait-by-trait dispositional judgments.  The relation between inter-individual variations in 
malleability beliefs and dispositional judgments at the aggregate level also holds at the level of 
individual traits.  Table 3 shows how scores on various measures of malleability beliefs were 
related to dispositional judgments of individual traits.  Generally, participants with lower 
omnibus trait malleability scores, or those who expressed a stronger belief that this set of specific 
traits are fixed, made significantly more confident dispositional inferences for most traits.  
Relations of comparable strength and form were observed when individual trait malleability 
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scores were taken to reflect beliefs specific to the target trait in each inference item.  When 
person theory scores were used, a relation in the same direction, albeit less pronounced and non-
significant, was found for most traits. 
-------Insert Table 3 about here------- 
Intra-individual Variations in Malleability Beliefs across Traits 
Each participant tended to perceive some differences in malleability among traits, as 
evidenced by within-person variations in individual trait malleability scores.  We now examine 
the relation of such variations to a person’s dispositional judgments across specific traits.  We 
conducted a hierarchical regression analysis in which dispositional judgments for a given trait 
(averaged across inference types) were first regressed on the subject variable, created using 
criterion scaling to represent variance due to individual differences.  The subject vector consisted 
of the unstandardized predicted score or mean on the criterion (i.e., the dependent or predicted 
variable) for each subject (see Pedhazur, 1982, Chapter 14, for details of how criterion scaling 
can be applied in multiple regressions to analyze designs involving repeated measures).  This 
step controlled for inter-individual variations in judgments.  Next, the perceived malleability of 
the trait was entered.  To isolate within-person variations in perceived malleability across traits, 
the malleability variable in this analysis was formed by calculating, for each participant, a mean 
of the individual trait knowledge scores across the 30 traits (i.e., omnibus trait malleability score) 
and then subtracting the mean from each of its contributors.  As predicted, less confident 
judgments were made for traits perceived by the individual to be relatively malleable than for 
those perceived to be more fixed, b = -2.29, t (2808) = -15.44, p < .001. 
Discussion 
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 This study illustrates the incremental utility of considering trait-specific beliefs, which 
are conceptually and empirically related to their general beliefs about the malleability of 
personality.
2  
First, inter-individual variations in trait-specific malleability beliefs predicted 
dispositional judgments better than general beliefs as measured by person theory scores.  Second, 
within-person variations in trait-specific malleability beliefs predicted fine-grained differences in 
a person’s dispositional judgments among traits.  Such within-person analysis is not possible if 
we consider only general malleability beliefs. 
 In this study, participants’ malleability beliefs were assessed on a one-shot basis, 
concurrent with their dispositional judgments.  As malleability beliefs are somewhat unstable 
over time, such beliefs may not be very predictive of dispositional judgments at another point in 
time, especially over long intervals (Poon & Koehler, 2004).  Temporal instability in malleability 
beliefs may be conceptualized as within-person variations in the relative accessibility of existing 
entity versus incremental knowledge.  With a knowledge-activation conceptualization, one can 
readily specify (and test) mechanisms underlying such variations by drawing on factors known to 
affect knowledge accessibility. 
Study 2 
The relative accessibility of entity or incremental knowledge may be increased by recent 
prior activation (cf. Higgins, 1996).  In Study 2, participants’ entity or incremental knowledge 
was primed (or activated) before they made dispositional judgments in an allegedly unrelated 
study.  According to the present framework, entity (incremental) knowledge would become 
relatively more accessible in the entity-prime (incremental-prime) condition.  Participants were 
predicted to make more confident dispositional inferences after receiving an entity prime than 
after receiving an incremental prime. 
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Method 
Priming 
 Introductory psychology students (n = 104) were invited to participate in two allegedly 
unrelated studies.  The first study, referred to as a study of reading comprehension and 
explanation, was used to introduce the priming manipulation.  Participants were asked to read 
and answer questions about three passages.  The first passage was on gardening, and the second 
on cooking.  They were created to conceal our intention of using the third passage, a biography, 
as a prime.  The two-page biography detailed the achievements of a fictitious Nobel Prize winner 
named “Max Hermann”, the major milestones of his life (e.g., born in Germany, attended 
university in Germany, and later settled in the U.S.), along with descriptions of his personality.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two priming conditions.  In the entity-prime 
condition, Hermann was portrayed as unchanging throughout his life, being introverted and 
analytical from childhood through adulthood to old age.  In the incremental-prime condition, 
temporal changes in his Hermann’s personality were emphasized.  He was first described as a 
rebellious youth, then as a single-minded, introverted scientist during adulthood, and finally as 
an outgoing, generous old man concerned with spiritual issues.  Participants were asked to use 
their own knowledge to explain why Hermann’s personality did not change (entity-prime 
condition) or changed a lot throughout his life (incremental-prime condition).  The biographies 
did not directly provide the explanations, but participants could refer to the material in the 
biographies in generating their explanations.  As participants were asked to apply aspects of their 
existing knowledge consistent with the hypothesis to be explained, we assumed that the relative 
accessibility of the targeted cluster of knowledge would be temporarily increased as a result. 
Dispositional Inferences and Belief Ratings 
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 Next, participants proceeded to a social judgment study.  They completed the 
dispositional inference questionnaire used in Study 1.  In addition, they expressed their views on 
several dimensions of human nature (e.g., happy—unhappy, untrustworthy—trustworthy, 
rational—irrational), including whether or not people’s personality can change on a 1 (can 
always change) to 9 (cannot change) scale.  We included only this one-item general belief 
measure (embedded among other “distracter” items), instead of our 30-item omnibus trait 
malleability measure, to prevent participants from consciously connecting the priming 
manipulation with the social judgment portion of this experiment.  Finally, participants were 
asked to write down any ideas they had about the purpose of the experimental session. 
 To maintain the cover story that the two studies were unrelated, apart from separate study 
names, we used separate consent forms and different typefaces for the explanation and social 
judgment questionnaires.  None of our participants reported suspicion that the biography in the 
explanation task was intended to influence their subsequent social judgments. 
Results 
Dispositional Judgments 
 We averaged each participant’s probability judgments for all 30 items within each 
inference type.  The resultant scores were submitted to a 2 (priming) X 4 (inference type) mixed-
model ANOVA with the second factor varied within participants.  Table 4 displays the means of 
this analysis.  As predicted, participants who received the entity prime generally made more 
confident dispositional judgments than did those who received an incremental prime (Ms = 
71.4% vs. 67.6%), F (1, 102) = 7.35, MSE = 212.47, p < .01).
3
  This finding is consistent with  
the idea that clusters of entity and incremental knowledge co-exist within an individual, and that 
momentary variations in their relative accessibility affect one’s proclivity for lay dispositionism. 
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 As in Study 1, participants made more confident dispositional judgments from a person’s 
traits (M = 76.3% when predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits; M = 69.8% when 
predicting temporal stability of traits) than from trait-relevant behaviors (M = 64.9% when 
predicting cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behaviors; M = 67.1% when inferring 
traits from trait-relevant behaviors), F (3, 306) = 39.82, MSE = 63.89, p < .001.  Inference type 
did not interact with priming to influence judgments, F (3, 306) = .35, MSE = 63.89, ns. 
------Insert Table 4 about here------- 
General Belief Ratings 
As one would expect if each of the core person theories is loosely connected with other 
consistent pieces of knowledge, participants expressed a stronger general belief that personality 
cannot change after receiving an entity prime than after receiving an incremental prime [Ms = 
4.23 vs. 3.33; 1 = can always change; 9 = cannot change; F (1, 102) = 7.83, MSE = 2.71, p < 
.01].   
Within each priming condition, participants’ post-priming general belief ratings did not 
significantly correlate with their overall dispositional judgments (r = -.07 in the entity-prime 
condition; r = .18 in the incremental-prime condition).  In light of this result, it is not surprising 
that the effect of priming on dispositional judgments remained significant even when the general 
belief ratings were included as a covariate, F (1, 101) = 6.09, MSE = 214.03, p < .05.  Thus, 
participants’ dispositional inferences appeared to be influenced by both general and specific 
knowledge made relatively more accessible by the priming task, in a manner that was not fully 
captured by its impact on the general beliefs they expressed towards the end of the experimental 
session.   
Content of Explanations 
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 Coding scheme.  Participants’ open-ended explanations of why Hermann’s personality 
remained unchanged (or changed a lot) allow us to identify the contents of lay knowledge 
supporting an entity (or incremental) personality theory.  Their explanations were analyzed in 
terms of the relative weight they accorded to three information categories relevant for person 
perception: (1) trait information, including personality traits and such context-free dispositions 
as intelligence and morality; (2) process information, specific psychological states that mediate 
behavior or outcomes, such as context-specific goals, construals, and moods; and (3) situational 
information, contextual factors affecting a person’s behavior.  For coding purposes, participants’ 
responses were segmented into units corresponding to each clause.  Irrelevant units were then 
identified.  Reiterations of the explanation question, personal reactions to the biographies which 
were unrelated to the explanation question, and units that did not fit into any of the three 
information categories were deemed irrelevant.  Two raters were given transcriptions of 
participants’ entire responses with units demarcated and numbered (cf. Morris & Peng, 1994).  
Relevant units were indicated on the coding sheets.  There were 439 relevant units across the two 
priming conditions.  The raters, who were blind to the experimental conditions associated with 
the responses, independently coded each relevant unit as falling into one of the three information 
categories.  Examples of each category of information appear in Table 5.  The inter-rater 
reliability of the coding was acceptable (Cohen’s kappa = .70; proportion of inter-rater 
agreement before Cohen’s correction for chance = .80). 
-------Insert Table 5 about here------- 
 Differences in social information use across priming conditions.  For each participant, the 
number of units coded into each of the three information categories was tallied from each rater’s 
rating, and then averaged across the two raters.  The averaged frequency counts were submitted 
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to a 2 (priming) X 3 (information category) mixed-model ANOVA, with the second factor varied 
within participants.  Table 6 displays the mean frequency for each cell.  This analysis yield a 
significant Priming X Information Category interaction, F (2, 204) = 49.92, MSE = 2.30, p < 
.001.  Relative to participants in the entity-prime condition, those in the incremental-prime 
condition focused less on traits [t (102) = -7.38, p < .001], and more on psychological processes 
[t (102) = 6.43, p < .001] and situations [t (102) = 3.70, p < .001] (see Table 6). 
-------Insert Table 6 about here------- 
Discussion 
We hold that the main effect of our priming procedures on dispositional judgments was 
due to differential activation of entity and incremental knowledge.  An alternative interpretation 
is that participants determined that presentation of the biography was intended to influence their 
dispositional judgments, and that they adjusted their judgments accordingly to meet the 
experimenter’s expectations.  We think this interpretation is unlikely.  The biography was 
included among several filler items as part of an allegedly unrelated reading comprehension 
study.  The “unrelated studies” design has been used widely and with considerable success in 
social cognition and other areas of research.  Because the content of the biography was 
manipulated between participants, furthermore, it would be difficult for a given participant to 
determine which aspects of the biography were supposed to influence their later judgments, 
which focused at least as much on situational instability as temporal instability in traits or trait-
relevant behavior.  If anything, the judgment task would be expected to draw participants’ 
attention to differences between inference types or between traits; it is not apparent how the 
biography would be seen as being relevant to either type of difference.  The account we offer, in 
which the priming manipulation affected the relative activation of entity and incremental 
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knowledge that in turn influenced the confidence with which dispositional judgments were made, 
would seem to be a more straightforward interpretation of the results.   
Our content analysis of participants’ explanations suggests differences in the composition 
of social information supporting two opposing views about personality.  An entity theory seems 
to be supported mainly by trait information, and to a lesser extent by process and situational 
information, as shown in explanations of why Hermann remained unchanged.  By contrast, an 
incremental theory appears to be supported primarily by information about psychological states 
and situations, and only secondarily by trait information, as seen in explanations of Hermann’s 
personality changes throughout his life.  Although knowledge used in participants’ explanations 
in either priming condition might only be a subset of knowledge activated by the priming 
procedure, the content of their explanations might very well reflect their information focus when 
they made social predictions or inferences, given the conceptual link between explanation and 
prediction.  Participants in the entity-prime condition might have focused on traits when making 
inferences, whereas those in the incremental-prime condition on psychological states and 
situations.  Such differences in inferential frame might underlie the effect of priming on 
dispositional inferences.
 
  
Our content analysis empirically corroborates Chiu et al.’s (1997) claim that it is the 
differential focus on traits versus psychological states and situations by entity and incremental 
theorists that gives rise to differences in their tendency to subscribe to inferential practices 
associated with lay dispositionism (see also Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001).  More 
importantly, this study suggests that an individual may not always perceive the social world 
using the same mental frame.  Instead, one’s inferential frame may shift when certain pieces of 
existing knowledge become more easily retrievable. 
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Study 3 
 To ascertain the generality of the findings in Study 2, this study used a different priming 
procedure to activate participants’ existing entity and incremental knowledge.  As detailed 
below, we used proverbs as a basis of our priming manipulation because interpretations of these 
pithy sayings rely on existing folkloristic or experiential knowledge.  Indeed, because of this 
property, proverbs have been used by researchers to prime other kinds of stored knowledge (e.g., 
Trope & Gaunt, 2000).  Any lingering doubts that the results of the previous study are in some 
way attributable to participants having discerned and complied with the experimenter’s 
expectation that the priming manipulation would influence their later dispositional judgments 
should be resolved in Study 3’s use of the proverbs task, which would seem to be an even more 
subtle priming manipulation than the biography task used in Study 2. 
Method 
 Introductory psychology students (n = 111) were invited to participate in two allegedly 
unrelated studies.  The first study was referred to as a study of proverbs in everyday life, in which 
the task was to answer questions about three proverbs.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two priming conditions.  In the entity-prime condition, the proverbs were consistent 
with the notion that personality is fixed (“You cannot teach an old dog new tricks”; “Old habits 
die hard”; “A leopard cannot change its spots”).  In the incremental-prime condition, the 
proverbs were consistent with the notion that personality is malleable (“It is never too late to 
learn”; “Experience is the best teacher”; “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”).  For each 
proverb, participants were asked to rate their familiarity with its meaning on a 6-point scale (1 = 
not at all familiar; 6 = very familiar), explain its meaning, and describe three situations to which 
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it could be applied.  They were also asked to indicate the initials of the first person who came to 
mind when thinking about the proverb, and to describe how that person exemplifies its meaning. 
 The procedure following the priming manipulation was identical to Study 2.  We added 
two forced-choice questions at the end of the dispositional inference questionnaire to check 
whether participants’ interpretations of the endpoints (0% and 100%) and the midpoint (50%) of 
the probability scale were consistent with our intended meaning. 
 Two participants who were suspicious of the link between the two parts of the 
experimental session were excluded from data analysis.  One participant who had heard about 
our study and another who reported feeling annoyed by it were also excluded.  Four additional 
participants were excluded because they misinterpreted our intended meaning of a 50% rating on 
the dispositional inference task, leaving 103 participants in the following analyses. 
Results 
Familiarity with Proverbs  
 We averaged each participant’s familiarity ratings for the three proverbs in his or her 
condition.  The resultant familiarity scores did not differ across priming conditions, t (101) = .18, 
ns.  The proverbs in both conditions were rated as familiar (Ms = 4.51 vs. 4.47 for the entity- and 
incremental-prime conditions respectively; 1 = not at all familiar, 6 = very familiar).  Indeed, 
most participants were able to explain their meanings, give examples of situations to which they 
can be applied, and provide illustrations using their memories of other people.   
Dispositional Judgments 
 We averaged each participant’s probability judgments for all 30 items within each 
inference type.  The resultant scores were submitted to a 2 (priming) X 4 (inference type) mixed-
model ANOVA with the second factor varied within participants.  Table 7 displays the means of 
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this analysis.  As in Study 2, participants who received an entity prime generally made more 
confident dispositional judgments than did those who received an incremental prime (Ms = 
70.0% vs. 66.1%), F (1, 101) = 6.24, MSE = 254.39, p < .05).
4
  The effect of the priming 
manipulation remained significant after controlling for the proverb familiarity ratings, F (1, 100) 
= 6.19, MSE = 256.9, p < .05.  This finding again is consistent with the idea that clusters of entity 
and incremental knowledge co-exist within an individual, and that variations in their relative 
accessibility influence one’s propensity for lay dispositionism. 
 As in Studies 1 and 2, participants made stronger dispositional inferences from a person’s 
traits (M = 73.8% when predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits; M = 68.5% when 
predicting temporal stability of traits) than from trait-relevant behaviors (M = 65.5% when 
predicting cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behaviors; M = 64.5% when inferring 
traits from trait-relevant behaviors), F (3, 303) = 44.49, MSE = 40.41, p < .001).  Inference type 
did not interact with the priming manipulation to influence dispositional judgments, F (3, 303) = 
.01, MSE = 40.41, ns. 
-------Insert Table 7 about here------- 
General Belief Ratings 
 As one would predict if each of the core person theories is loosely linked to other 
consistent pieces of knowledge, participants expressed a stronger belief that personality cannot 
change after receiving an entity prime than after receiving an incremental prime [(Ms = 4.49 vs. 
3.48; 1 = can always change; 9 = cannot change; F (1, 101) = 7.85, MSE = 3.34, p < .01].   
As in Study 2, within each priming condition, participants’ post-priming general belief 
ratings did not significantly correlate with their overall probability judgments (r = .06 in the 
entity-prime condition; r = .20 in the incremental-prime condition).  Given this result, it is not 
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surprising that the effect of priming on probability judgments remained significant even when 
the general belief ratings were used as a covariate, F (1, 100) = 4.27, MSE = 252.73, p < .05.  
Again, participants’ dispositional inferences seemed to be affected by both general and specific 
knowledge made relatively more accessible by the priming task, the impact of which was not 
entirely reflected in the general beliefs they expressed towards the end of the experimental 
session. 
Discussion 
 The priming tasks in Studies 2 and 3 invoked the use of different aspects of lay 
knowledge.  In Study 2, participants could use their causal schemas when explaining why 
Hermann’s personality remained unchanged or changed a lot across his lifespan.  In Study 3, 
they could rely on semantic memory when explaining the meaning of proverbs, and episodic 
memory when illustrating their meanings through their everyday experience.  Seemingly 
disparate pieces of knowledge possessed by an individual may be organized in such a way that 
some cluster around the notion that personality is fixed and some around the notion that 
personality is malleable, enabling the kind of spreading activation that produced parallel results 
across the two studies.  
General Discussion 
 Motivated by our finding that temporal instability of person theories can considerably 
attenuate their long-term predictive validity (Poon & Koehler, 2004), we suggest that the 
individual-differences approach prevalent in the literature does not adequately capture dynamic 
relations between lay personality knowledge and dispositional judgments.  Following Dweck and 
colleagues’ suggestion that lay theories research may benefit from pursuing the implications of a 
knowledge-activation framework (Dweck et al., 1995b), we have explicated the content and 
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processes of a knowledge-activation conceptualization from which specific hypotheses regarding 
inter- and intra-individual variations in knowledge states and their implications for dispositional 
judgments can be derived.  The studies we have reported empirically evaluate aspects of this 
conceptualization. 
 First, this work affirms the incremental value of incorporating relatively specific pieces 
of knowledge (e.g., ideas about particular traits, factors affecting personality, memories of 
specific individuals) in theorizing about laypeople’s social thinking.  In Study 1, trait-specific 
malleability beliefs predicted inter-individual variations in dispositional judgments better than 
general malleability beliefs.  Trait-specific beliefs also predicted intra-individual variations in 
dispositional judgments among traits, which would remain unaccounted for had we only 
measured participants’ general beliefs.  In Studies 2 and 3, the effect of the priming 
manipulations on participants’ dispositional judgments remained significant even when their 
post-priming general belief ratings were controlled.  Participants might have used both general 
and specific knowledge made relatively more accessible by the priming tasks when making 
dispositional judgments, instead of relying exclusively on their general beliefs. 
  Second, and more important, this research provides evidence that most people possess 
both entity and incremental knowledge, and that operation of such knowledge may follow 
principles known to govern activation and use of other kinds of social knowledge.  In Studies 2 
and 3, we demonstrate knowledge accessibility effects on dispositional judgments through fairly 
subtle priming manipulations that utilized aspects of participants’ existing knowledge.  
Specifically, when entity (incremental) knowledge was made relatively more accessible by 
recent priming, participants exhibited more (less) confident dispositional judgments. 
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From a knowledge-activation perspective, the finding that priming procedures in Studies 
2 and 3 influenced participants’ post-priming expressed beliefs about the malleability of 
personality can help account for the naturally-occurring temporal instability in person theories 
observed by Poon & Koehler (2004).  One can readily identify everyday experiences 
conceptually analogous to our priming procedures.  Examples include trying to making sense of 
the changes (or lack thereof) in the personality of a friend (cf. Study 2), and exposure to proverbs 
and other culturally shared notions of human nature in conversations or other communicative 
contexts (cf. Study 3).  These everyday occurrences may produce idiosyncratic variations in the 
accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge, which manifest as temporal instability in 
person theories.  
We hope that our findings will instigate further explorations of the wide-ranging 
empirical implications afforded by a knowledge-activation conceptualization.  While the relative 
accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge was manipulated through prior activation in 
Studies 2 and 3, future research may explore other determinants of accessibility, such as the 
perceiver’s goal.  It has been suggested that, relative to incremental theorists, entity theorists tend 
to hold an evaluative goal (i.e., goal of judging whether someone is good or bad) when 
processing person information (Dweck, 1996; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, & Sacks, 1997).  Whether 
activating an evaluative goal will increase the relative accessibility of entity knowledge awaits 
investigation.  Another intriguing direction for future research concerns factors that moderate the 
impact of accessible personality knowledge.  Previous research on other kinds of social 
knowledge suggests that the use of relatively accessible constructs tends to increase under high 
need for closure (e.g., Ford & Kruglanski, 1995).  Yet, if accessible knowledge is judged to be 
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irrelevant, its use in social judgments may be inhibited (Higgins, 1996).  Whether similar 
principles apply to relatively accessible entity or incremental knowledge remains to be tested. 
Investigations along these lines will enrich lay knowledge research, which has largely 
focused on the implications of inter-individual variations in person theories at a particular 
moment.  As noted, within-person variations in knowledge accessibility, as implicated by 
temporal instability in person theories reported by Poon and Koehler (2004), can be accounted 
for.  Furthermore, chronic individual differences may be explained by examining stable factors 
affecting knowledge activation and use (e.g., prolonged contextual activation, chronically high 
need for closure).  In this article, we simply assume that chronic and relatively temporary sources 
of accessibility combine additively.  Yet, their precise relationship remains to be tested.  Future 
research may examine whether individuals with a chronically large discrepancy in the 
accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge and those with a chronically small 
discrepancy respond differently to priming procedures designed to increase activation of their 
chronically less accessible knowledge cluster. 
Relation to the Cultural Cognition Literature 
Conceptually, the present framework is akin to the dynamic constructivist approach to 
the study of cultural cognition, which similarly uses knowledge-activation principles to depict 
the influence of culturally-conferred knowledge on social thinking (Hong et al., 2000).  The most 
significant contribution of this approach is that it can explain how the relative influence of 
different cultural theories varies within bi-cultural or multi-cultural individuals (i.e., individuals 
who have internalized two or more cultures) across situations and time.  Paralleling the priming 
studies in our research, Hong et al. showed that bi-cultural individuals (e.g., Westernized Hong 
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Kong Chinese) switch between inferential frames as situational cues (e.g., cultural icons) affect 
the relative accessibility of their cultural theories.   
 Growing evidence suggests that East Asians are less inclined to subscribe to inferential 
practices indicative of lay dispositionism than are North Americans, at least when situational 
information is salient (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Morris & Peng, 1994; Norenzayan, Choi, & 
Nisbett, 2002).  Can a knowledge-activation framework account for such cross-cultural 
differences?  Su, Chiu, Hong, Leung, Peng and Morris (1999) propose that differences between 
American and Chinese social structures foster cultural differences in theories about the social 
world and about individuals.  Specifically, American society conforms more closely to the 
Structure Accommodates Individual model, in which individuals are expected to maintain their 
unique attributes, as they are placed in positions that match their needs and skills.  In contrast, 
Chinese society conforms more closely to the Individual Accommodates Structure model, in 
which individuals are assigned to pre-specified groups and to roles and are obliged to perform 
role-prescribed duties.  With such differences, it is suggested that, compared to Chinese 
individuals, Americans more strongly believe in the fixedness of personal attributes and the 
fluidity of the social world.  From a knowledge-activation perspective, chronic cross-cultural 
differences in the relative accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge about individuals 
and about the social world may contribute to the aforementioned cultural differences in lay 
dispositionist thinking.   
Implications for Other Facets of Social Cognition and Beyond 
 Laypeople’s knowledge about the malleability of personality has implications for a rich 
set of social-cognitive phenomena associated with lay dispositionism, beyond the four types of 
dispositional inferences examined in this research.  For example, past research suggests that, 
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compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists more eagerly seek out and rely more heavily 
on potentially trait-relevant information when making social decisions (e.g., deciding whether a 
defendant is guilty in a fictitious murder case) (Gervey et al., 1999).  Also, entity theorists make 
more extreme stereotypical trait judgments of social groups than do incremental theorists (Levy 
et al., 1998).  The current work suggests the possibility that the tendency to rely on trait 
information in making social decisions and to assign stereotypical traits to social groups may 
vary within an individual perceiver as well, depending on factors influencing the relative 
accessibility of the perceiver’s entity versus incremental knowledge.  
The current research shows that when entity knowledge is relatively more accessible, 
people exhibit greater confidence in inferences involving traits (or dispositions).  Yet, social 
inferences do not always involve traits.  For instance, people may predict a concrete behavior 
based on situations and psychological states (e.g., Alex is heading to a job interview.  He is 
worried that he will be late.  Will he help a stranger who asks for directions?).  The present 
framework predicts that this kind of inference will be made with greater confidence when 
incremental knowledge is relatively more accessible.  This prediction remains to be tested. 
 The present framework of lay personality knowledge has potentially rich links with other 
well-researched theoretical models and implications beyond social cognition.  In particular, some 
researchers (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Graham, 1995; Sorrentino, 1995) have linked the entity-
incremental dimension of personality to dimensions of causal attributions identified earlier by 
Weiner (1985), including locus (whether a cause is internal or external to a person), stability 
(whether a cause is constant or varying over time), and controllability (whether a cause is under 
volitional control).  An entity theorist who attributes a personal or social outcome (e.g., success 
or failure to achieve a particular goal) to a fixed trait may be seen as attributing the outcome to 
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an internal, stable, and uncontrollable cause.  Different attribution styles are associated with a 
wide array of emotional and behavioral correlates (for a review, see Weiner, 1985; Weiner & 
Graham, 1999), and so are different person theories (for a review, see Dweck and Leggett, 1988; 
Dweck et al., 1995a).  In Dweck et al.’s (1995b) view, person theories give rise to different 
attribution styles.  Future research based on a knowledge-activation perspective may 
systematically explore how different attribution styles are allied with the networks of entity and 
incremental knowledge, and how relative activation of particular knowledge networks impact 
one’s emotional and behavioral responses to personal and social outcomes (cf. Dweck et al., 
1995b). 
Clinical Relevance 
Clinical psychologists sometimes conduct personality assessments using interview and 
questionnaire data, the interpretations of which often involve trait inferences.  A patient judged 
to exhibit certain traits (e.g., conscientious, controlling, orderly, and rigid) to an excessive degree 
may receive a personality disorder diagnosis (e.g., obsessive-compulsive personality), which 
may be used to understand his or her difficulties.  Assessment of personality (disorders) is often 
criticized for its low reliability (e.g., Perry, 1992).  According to the present framework, chronic 
differences in the relative accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge among clinicians 
may explain some of the inter-rater variance.  Variations in knowledge accessibility within the 
same clinician across time and situations may constitute another source of unreliability. 
On the intervention front, instilling in patients hope that they can change (improve) is 
often seen as a core task in psychotherapy.  Indeed, evidence based on non-patient samples 
suggests that incremental self-theorists tend to show more constructive behavioral and emotional 
responses to life challenges than do entity self-theorists (Beer, 2003; Dweck, 1999).
  
Related to 
Lay Personality Knowledge 34 
this evidence is the demonstrated success of attribution re-training programs in increasing 
achievement motivation and enhancing academic performance of college students who 
experience academic setbacks at the time of intervention.  These attribution re-training programs 
directly communicate to students that their academic setbacks are due to unstable causes (see, 
e.g., Wilson & Linville, 1985; Van Overwalle & De Metsenaere, 1990).  To the extent that being 
an incremental theorist is beneficial, it might be worth exploring in future research the 
therapeutic value of raising the relative accessibility of patients’ existing incremental self-
knowledge (i.e., knowledge supporting the view that positive self-change is possible). 
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Footnotes 
1 
In this research, all behaviors in the inference task were evidently trait (or disposition)-relevant, 
as they were categorized in trait terms (see Table 1).  However, if behaviors are not clearly trait-
relevant, a Malleability Beliefs X Inference type interaction might emerge.  General and trait-
specific malleability beliefs might have a more pronounced effect on inferences based on traits 
than on inferences based on concrete behaviors that are not clearly trait-relevant.  This possibility 
awaits further research. 
2  
It could be argued that the omnibus trait malleability scale predicted participants’ inferences 
better partly due to shared method variance between the two sets of measures.  However, it is 
unlikely that shared method variance could completely account for large difference in predictive 
utility between the two measures. 
3
 Our main focus was on how the relative accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge, 
as affected by the priming manipulation, influenced participants’ dispositional inferences.  Thus, 
comparing judgments between the entity- and incremental-prime conditions is sufficient for 
testing our hypothesis.  However, having a baseline condition could provide additional 
information about the locus of the observed priming effect.  Study 1 could be used as a proxy 
baseline condition, as there was no experimental manipulation and the dispositional judgment 
questionnaire used was the same as Study 2.  In doing so, we found that the mean judgment of 
the entity-prime condition fell at the 62
nd
 percentile and the mean judgment of the incremental-
prime condition fell at the 44
th
 percentile of all the judgments (averaged across inference types 
per participant) in Study 1.  This observation suggests that our entity prime had a dispositionist-
elevating effect and our incremental prime had a dispositionist-reducing effect. 
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4 
 Again, our focus was on how the relative accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge, 
as affected by priming, influenced participants’ dispositional inferences.  Comparing judgments 
between the entity- and incremental-prime conditions is adequate for our purpose.  Nonetheless, 
we could use Study 1 as a proxy baseline condition to obtain additional information about the 
locus of the observed priming effect.  In doing so, we found that the mean judgment of the 
entity-prime condition fell at the 57
th
 percentile and the mean judgment of the incremental-prime 
condition fell at the 40
th
 percentile of all the judgments (averaged across inference types per 
participant) in Study 1.  This observation suggests that our entity prime had a dispositionist-
elevating effect and our incremental prime had a dispositionist-reducing effect. 
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Table 1 
An Example Item for Each Type of Dispositional Inference (Study 1) 
Inference Type Example 
Predicting trait-relevant behavior 
from traits 
Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait 
affectionate than Person B. 
What is the probability that you would find Person A to 
behave in a more affectionate way than Person B in a 
particular situation? 
Inferring traits from trait-relevant 
behaviors 
Person A behaved in a more affectionate way than Person B 
in a particular situation. 
What is the probability that Person A is more strongly 
characterized by the trait affectionate than Person B? 
Predicting cross-situational 
consistency of trait-relevant 
behaviors 
Person A behaved in a more affectionate way than Person B 
in a particular situation. 
What is the probability that in a completely different 
situation, you would find Person A to behave in a more 
affectionate way than Person B? 
Predicting temporal stability of 
traits 
Presently, Person A is more strongly characterized by the 
trait affectionate than Person B. 
What is the probability that Person A will be more strongly 
characterized by the trait affectionate than Person B five 
years from now? 
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Table 2 
Summary of Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Dispositional Judgments (Study 1) 
 
  F 
Source df Omnibus Trait Malleability Person Theory 
 Between subjects 
Malleability Beliefs 1 11.19** 0.93 
S 95 (333.47) (369.11) 
 Within subjects 
Inference Type 3 37.23*** 36.82*** 
Inference Type X Malleability Beliefs 3 1.85 0.77 
Inference Type X S 285 (53.27) (53.89) 
 
Note.  Judgments were collapsed over 30 traits.  Variables were hierarchically entered in the 
order listed.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = subjects within 
groups.  See Pedhazur (1982, Chapter 14) for technical details of how data obtained in mixed 
designs can be analyzed using multiple regression analyses. 
** p < .01.  *** p < .001. 
 
Lay Personality Knowledge 46 
Table 3 
Correlations and Regression Slopes between Dispositional Judgments for Each Trait and 
Different Measures of Malleability Beliefs (Study 1) 
 
Omnibus Trait 
Malleability 
Scores 
Individual Trait 
Malleability 
 Scores 
Person Theory 
Scores 
Trait in Inference Task 
r b r b r b 
organized       -.43** -7.0** -.09 -.9 -.10 -.9 
polite          -.31** -5.7** -.21* -2.3* -.10 -1.1 
secretive       -.30** -5.4** -.31** -3.5** -.09 -1.0 
shy             -.29** -5.8** -.44** -4.9** -.13 -1.6 
athletic        -.21* -4.3* -.46** -4.2** -.08 -.9 
assertive       -.32** -5.2** -.39** -3.7** -.04 -.4 
unconventional  -.12 -2.1 -.23* -2.7* -.02 -.2 
practical       -.31** -4.9** -.24* -2.7* -.11 -1.0 
punctual        -.30** -5.7** -.26** -2.3** .01 .1 
ambitious       -.21* -3.6* -.27** -2.6** -.01 -.1 
affectionate    -.21* -3.6* -.25* -2.4* -.14 -1.4 
loyal           -.25* -4.3* -.27** -2.6** -.12 -1.3 
active          -.22* -3.6* -.37** -3.0** -.02 -.3 
competitive     -.33** -5.6** -.39** -3.7** -.15 -1.6 
procrastinating -.36** -6.5** -.32** -3.3** -.05 -.5 
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sensitive       -.22* -3.7* -.19† -2.0† -.14 -1.4 
independent     -.21* -4.1* -.21* -2.3* -.12 -1.4 
idealistic      -.24* -4.2* -.10 -1.1 -.04 -.4 
sympathetic     -.19† -3.5† -.21* -2.5* -.13 -1.4 
conscientious   -.23* -4.0* -.23* -2.7* -.09 -1.0 
anxious         -.26** -5.2** -.53** -6.3** -.10 -1.2 
moody           -.22* -4.0* -.50** -4.9** -.04 -.5 
likable         -.24* -4.6* -.48** -5.1** -.14 -1.6 
warm            -.28** -5.0** -.49** -5.0** -.06 -.7 
tidy            -.29** -5.4** -.31** -3.1** .02 .2 
unpredictable   -.18† -3.4† -.06 -.8 -.03 -.3 
reliable        -.31** -5.6** -.24* -2.4* -.17† -1.9† 
curious         -.20* -3.6* -.37** -4.2** -.16 -1.8 
optimistic      -.17† -2.9† -.15 -1.4 .01 .1 
tolerant        -.16 -2.8 -.18† -1.8† .01 .1 
Mean  -.25 -4.5 -.29 -3.0 -.08 -.8 
Note.  Correlation coefficients (r) were between probability judgments (averaged over inference 
types) and scores on various measures of malleability beliefs.  Unstandardized regression 
coefficients (b) depict change in judged probability per unit change along various measures of 
malleability beliefs in regression slopes.  Negative (downward) slopes indicate that lower scores 
on the belief measures were associated with higher probability judgments. 
†p < .10.  * p < .05.  **p < .01. 
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Table 4 
Probability Judgments as a Function of Priming and Inference Type (Study 2) 
 
 Priming 
Inference Type Entity Incremental 
Predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits 77.2 75.4 
Inferring trait from trait-relevant behaviors 69.6 64.6 
Predicting cross-situational consistency of  
trait-relevant behaviors 
67.6 62.2 
Predicting temporal stability of traits 71.5 68.1 
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Table 5 
Examples of Trait, Process, and Situational Information in Participants’ Explanations in Each 
Priming Condition (Study 2) 
Social information category 
and priming condition 
Example 
Trait  
     Entity-prime “… because he was shy” 
     Incremental-prime “Hermann changed from being an introvert to an 
extrovert.” 
Process  
     Entity-prime “Completing his research and finding the truth 
obviously made Hermann happy” 
     Incremental-prime “… because his goals changed” 
Situation  
     Entity-prime “His parents never really socialized him as a child.” 
     Incremental-prime “The environment around him changed from time to 
time.” 
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Table 6 
Use of Different Categories of Social Information in Each Priming Condition (Study 2) 
 Social Information Category 
Priming Trait Process Situation 
Entity 2.81 .36 .64 
Incremental .69 2.19 1.75 
Note: Numbers in table represent mean number of units coded into each information category per 
participant.   
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Table 7 
Probability Judgments as a Function of Priming and Inference Type (Study 3) 
 
 Priming 
Inference Type Entity Incremental 
Predicting trait-relevant behaviors from traits 75.8 71.8 
Inferring trait from trait-relevant behaviors 66.3 62.6 
Predicting cross-situational consistency of 
trait-relevant behaviors 
67.5 63.5 
Predicting temporal stability of traits 70.4 66.5 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1.  Probability judgments as a function of omnibus trait malleability scores (top panel) 
and person theory scores (bottom panel) in Study 1.   
 
 
Lay Personality Knowledge 53 
Figure 1 
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